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Flaws in the Kyoto Protocol’s Pollution
Permit System
Adam Mellem
ABSTRACT.  The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 attempts to address the problem of global
warming by establishing national greenhouse gas emissions targets and timetables.  To
reduce emissions, the protocol outlines a tradeable pollution permit system.  The system
would allow countries with high abatement costs to purchase permits from countries with
low abatement costs, equalizing global marginal abatement costs.  The protocol, however,
is destined to fail because of the free-rider problem and the problem of trade leakage.
Given the correct guidelines, a tradeable pollution permit system would provide a market-
based, cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
I.  Introduction
The threat of global warming, caused by carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases, has brought together governments from around the
world who seek to limit greenhouse gas emissions.  Both the Rio summit
of 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 attempt to address the problem
of greenhouse gas emissions.
The essence of the Kyoto Protocol is the idea of tradeable pollution
permits.  The Protocol, however, outlines a tradeable pollution permit
system which is destined to fail because it does not require all countries
to participate in the system.  This encourages the free-rider problem and
creates the problem of leakage.  In addition, the European Union is
skeptical of such a system and favors a carbon tax.  
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2000, the
Protocol is all but dead.  Yet the problem of global warming remains and
must be addressed to avoid further and irreversible environmental
damage.  Given the correct guidelines, a tradeable pollution permit system
would provide a market-based, cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
II.  Global Warming
Naturally occurring greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, and about 20 other gases exist in the earth’s atmosphere,
trap heat and help maintain a livable climate.  When fossil fuels are
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burned, greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmosphere.  Global
warming is caused when these greenhouse gases, primarily carbon
dioxide, accumulate in such quantities that extra heat is trapped in the
atmosphere and the average temperature of the earth rises [See Callan,
2000].  This warming could cause severe, irreversible damage to the
environment.  
The cause of global warming is still widely debated among
environmental scientists.  Many suggest that global warming is a natural,
cyclical phenomenon.  The earth has experienced past warming periods
which were followed by cooling periods [Callan, 2000, 382].  Others,
however, argue that global warming is primarily a result of the emissions
of greenhouse gasses in industrialized economies.  For the purpose of this
paper, I assume that global warming is directly effected by the emissions
of greenhouse gasses.  
Industrial development has dramatically increased carbon dioxide
emissions.  Even as the problem of global warming has come to light,
carbon emissions have increased 2.4 percent since 1987 [Larsen, 1994,
para. 5].  Richard N. Cooper, Boas Professor of International Economics
at Harvard University, estimates that “energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions will grow by fully 30 percent between 1990 and 2010” [1998,
67].  It is evidence and projections such as these that have drawn
countries together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
III.  The Earth Summit
The groundwork for the Kyoto Protocol was laid in 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro, which hosted the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, commonly known as the Earth Summit.  The convention drew
world wide attention.  More than 6,000 delegates attended, representing
over 170 countries [Callan, 2000, 15].  The convention established some
of the first global provisions to address global warming.  Along with
many other provisions, the treaty encouraged countries to pursue
economic strategies that would limit greenhouse gas emissions, to
increase public awareness of global warming through education, and to
participate in international research on global warming [Callan, 2000,
388].  
The requisite 50 countries, including the U.S, ratified the treaty in
1993 and it became legally binding in 1994 [Callan, 2000, 389].  The
treaty, however, had no provisions for implementation and no penalty for
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failure to comply.  As a result, the treaty was signed quickly and with
little political difficulty.  Cooper states, “Rio committed signatory
governments to do something about global climate change, but it did not
commit them to take any specific actions” [1998, 66].
IV.  The Kyoto Protocol
In December 1997, representatives from many of the world’s
governments met in Kyoto, Japan, to continue the process started in Rio
and to establish a plan to curb global greenhouse gas emissions.  The
treaty drafted in Kyoto, called the Kyoto Protocol, established national
emissions targets and timetables [Barrett, 1998, para. 1].  The agreement
called for an average global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 7
percent below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012, setting individual targets for
each participating country [Rollings-Magnusson, 2000, 348].
The Protocol separates countries into two groups: Annex I countries
and Annex II countries.  Annex I countries are the industrial countries
listed in the original Framework Convention [Barrett, 1998, para. 6].
These countries are responsible for the majority of global carbon
emissions.  Annex II countries are developing countries whose percentage
of total carbon emissions is much less than Annex I countries.  In order
for the Protocol to become binding, 55 countries, responsible for 55
percent of the total carbon emissions of Annex I countries must ratify the
Protocol [Barrett, 1998, para. 6].  As of March, 2003, 105 countries with
43.9 percent of the total carbon emissions had accepted the treaty, 29 of
which were Annex I countries [www.unfccc.de].
Because of the U.S. decision not to ratify the treaty, the Protocol has
little chance of success.  The Protocol can still be ratified without the
U.S., but without the world’s leading polluter it seems futile [Barrett,
1998, para. 10].  Participating counties would be restricted in their
emissions while the U.S. and other non-participating countries would gain
the benefits of a healthier environment without the abatement costs.  Of
the aforementioned 105 counties who have ratified the treaty, most are
Annex II countries for which the treaty does not limit total emissions [The
Economist, 2003, 64].  Thus, a significant flaw in the Kyoto Protocol is
the free-rider problem.
The Kyoto Protocol does not require developing countries, such as
China and India, to reduce emissions.  China and India argue that today’s
modern industrial countries have caused global warming and should
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therefore be expected to endure the cost associated with emissions
reductions [The Economist, 2001, para. 14].  But Annex II countries are
expected to contribute significant levels of greenhouse gas emissions as
their economies develop, and within a few decades, countries such as
China and India are expected to be the world’s largest polluters [The
Economist, 2001, para. 15].  Cooper states that, “By 2010 developing
countries are expected to contribute 45 percent of total greenhouse gas
emissions, and China and India alone will experience greater growth in
emissions than all the OECD countries combined” [1998, 68].  Since the
Protocol does not require developing countries to participate, they get a
free ride while other participating countries must endure economic
hardship.  Worse yet, the free-rider problem is detrimental to the tradeable
permit system
V.  The Permit System
Each carbon permit allows one metric ton of carbon emissions one time
[Cramton, 1999, 258, 265].  Governments can either issue a certain
number of permits, referred to as grandfathering, or auction off the
permits.  The total number of permits issued or auctioned would limit the
total amount of emissions [Cramton, 1999, 259].  The permits could then
be bought or sold in a secondary market for the pollution permits.
Since each industry has a different marginal abatement cost curve, a
uniform reduction across all industries is far from cost-efficient [Hoel,
1991, 95].  Forcing each firm to reduce emissions to a uniform level may
cost some industries very little, while for others it may not be feasible.
The same is true on a global level.  Each country has a different aggregate
marginal abatement cost curve, which is the sum of the marginal
abatement cost curves of all industries in the country.
Tradeable pollution permits allow countries with high abatement
costs to purchase permits from countries with low abatement costs [Hoel,
1991, 95].  A global cost-effective level of carbon emissions is reached
when marginal abatement costs are equalized among all countries [Hoel,
1991, 97].  As Scott Callan from Bentley College states, “The result is a
cost-effective allocation of abatement responsibilities” [2000, 145].
The Kyoto Protocol does not restrict the permit market and permits
could be traded internationally [Cramton, 1999, 258].  Each country could
then trade permits with other countries, allowing countries with lower
abatement costs to sell permits to countries with higher abatement costs.
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The permit market would also encourage technological advance or cost-
cutting production methods in order to reduce emissions and sell unused
permits.
Because the Kyoto Protocol does not require developing countries to
participate in the permit system, the permit market would not find the
optimal global price for permits.  It would be marginally effective,
reducing emissions among Annex I countries which could trade with each
other.  Countries with low abatement costs, such as Russia and Eastern
Europe, would be able to trade with countries in the European Union, the
U.S., and Japan, who may have higher abatement costs.  The economic
cost of abatement would fall fully on Annex I countries.  The cost would
be higher than necessary because Annex II countries would not
participate.  Thus, permit prices would not fall to their optimal level and
would not completely equalize marginal abatement costs.
Developing countries and industrialized countries could both benefit
from a genuinely global system.  If all countries were required to limit
emissions and participate in the tradeable permit system, less developed
countries with lower abatement costs could sell their permits to other
countries [Barrett, 1998, para. 59].  Scott Barrett from the London
Business School states that “if developing countries had agreed to be
bound by targets, then they could be able to trade with the Annex I
countries and–subject to appropriate choice of their emission ceilings–be
virtually sure of being better off” [1998, para. 59].  
VI.  Trade Leakage
Since the Kyoto Protocol does not require all countries to participate
in the treaty, there is potential for a problem called trade leakage [Barrett,
1998, para. 77].  As Annex I countries participate in the Protocol and
reduce emissions, demand for the fossil-fuels that cause carbon emissions
will be reduced.  This decrease in demand will cause fossil-fuel prices to
fall.  The developing countries who are not participating in the Protocol
and who are not held to the same emission standards can then purchase
that fuel at a lower price.  Emissions from Annex II countries will then
increase, and total environmental benefits will be reduced.  Barrett states,
“Potentially, if leakage is strong enough, the agreement would only
succeed in redistributing global emissions” [1998, para. 77].
VII.  Implementation
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There are two ways to implement the permit system: governments can
issue permits, called grandfathering, or auction them off.
Grandfathering permits allows a government to issue permits to firms
on the basis of past usage, on current emissions levels, or political favor
[Cramton, 1999, 259].  The method provides more political control over
the distribution of permits and is preferred by the U.S. [Cramton, 1999,
259].
Cramton argues that the grandfathering of permits is an inefficient
way to distribute pollution permits [1999, 259].  Auctioned permits are
superior because “they provide more potential flexibility in distribution
of costs, and reduce the need for politically contentious arguments over
the allocation of rents” [Cramton, 1999, 260].  In addition, auctioning
permits provides economic rent to the government.  The government can
then redistribute this wealth to tax payers [Cramton, 1999, 258].
Auctioned permits do increase the marginal abatement cost for firms
that purchase permits [Callan, 2000, 149].  This can be very important.
Firms facing fiscal difficulties or a tight budget may be forced to shut
down.  Grandfathering permits allows industries to maintain a certain
level of emissions without increasing costs.  Should a firm decide to emit
beyond this level, the firm can then abate or purchase more permits.  This
does not guarantee that a firm will not face fiscal difficulty, but
grandfathering can lower abatement costs.  Governments could, however,
use the revenues received from auctioned permits to provide grants or
loans to those businesses most affected by abatement.  Funds could be
granted for a given period of time, allowing firms to develop new
methods of production to reduce emissions.  
VIII.  Tradeable Pollution Permits vs. Carbon Taxes
The European community prefers to curb carbon emissions by
implementing a carbon tax and is skeptical of a tradeable pollution permit
system [Barrett, 1998, para. 42].  However, the tax proposed by the
European Council, which has not yet been enacted, shows why the
European community prefers a carbon tax.  Coal, the most carbon-
intensive fossil fuel, is produced at high cost in many European Union
countries [Cooper, 1998, 75].  A required reduction in emissions would
quickly lead abating industries to find other sources of energy with less
carbon emissions.  This would negatively affect European coal producers.
6
Major Themes in Economics, Vol. 5 [2003], Art. 7
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol5/iss1/7
Mellem: Flaws in the Kyoto Protocol's Pollution Permit System72
A government controlled carbon tax, however, can minimize these losses.
The tax proposed by the European Council gives special preference to
coal, yet taxes nuclear power, the least carbon-intensive and most
efficient source of electricity [Cooper, 1998, 75].  
An efficient tax, free from political influence, could encourage a
reduction of emissions and, in the long run, should decrease the demand
for fossil fuels [Cooper, 1998, 74].  The tax could also provide
governments a source of revenue [Cooper, 1998, 74].  However, a
tradeable pollution permit system has two advantages over a carbon tax.
First, in a carbon tax system, the government must search for the tax
which would reduce emissions by the required amount.  In a permit
system, the market-clearing level would be found by the market where the
marginal abatement costs are equalized across all countries.  Second, a
permit system is much more flexible then a tax system.  Permits can be
introduced or removed in order to reach a desired environmental objective
[Callan, 2000, 149].  A tax system belabored by bureaucracy is slow to
adjust to the market.  If the tax chosen does not produce the optimal level
of emissions, it is much more difficult to change.  With a permit system,
the government need not intervene and optimality will be reached [Callan,
2000, 149].
A tax does guarantee the government some form of economic rent.
However, a system of auctioned permits, as discussed above, would also
provide the government economic rent without the same degree of market
intervention. 
In some instances, a tradeable pollution permit market can be less
efficient then a carbon tax.   If abatement costs for firms fall dramatically,
for example because of new technology, the firms could sell their permits
to older firms, allowing them to increase their total emissions.  This is
easily avoided, however, if the total amount of pollution permits on the
market is reduced as technology improves [Harris, 2002, 343]. 
IX.  Further Research: Banking and Futures Markets
As mentioned before, each carbon permit allows one metric ton of carbon
emissions one time [Cramton, 1999, 258, 265].  The Kyoto Protocol does
not require emissions targets to be met each year, but to be met within the
2008-2012 time period [Barrett, 1998, para. 39].  Therefore, the
agreement allows countries to ‘bank’ permits for future use if they go
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unused [Barrett, 1998. para. 39].  The provision helps countries in the
abatement process, but as Cramton suggests, does not go far enough.  
Permits can and should be auctioned not only for the current
years but also for future issue years.  Thus, some permits for
2012 could be auctioned in 2008 even though they cannot be
used to offset carbon emissions until after 1 January 2012.  Early
auctions would facilitate the development of an active futures and
option market, thus improving risk allocation [Cramton, 1999,
265].
For example, without a futures market for permits, an industry may not
expand because of the uncertainty of acquiring permits in the future.
However, a futures market would allow an industry to purchase future
permits, assuring them a right to increase emissions in the future.   
It is unclear if a provision allowing the sale of future pollution
permits would be necessary in a successful Kyoto Protocol.  A futures
market would improve risk allocation, but may not be a prerequisite for
a binding agreement.
X.  Conclusion
Tradeable pollution permits can be a cost-effective solution to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.  The Kyoto Protocol, however, fails to offer
an efficient permit system because the treaty does not require full
cooperation.  Like a true free-rider, it is in a country’s best interest to
avoid abatement costs while many other countries bear the economic
burden of the environmental benefits.  The Kyoto Protocol makes little
attempt to deter free-riders.
The treaty also fails to help industries and countries allocate risk.
The sale of future permits would increase confidence in such a system
and aid future economic development, despite emissions reductions.
Given provisions that require full global cooperation, a treaty such as
the Kyoto Protocol could be very successful.   Each country would be a
competitor in the pollution permit market which would quickly establish
market equilibrium.  In such a market, even undeveloped countries could
be competitive, selling unused permits.  Such a treaty would be both
successful and advantageous for all participants.
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